Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications

Economics, Department of

7-2020

Competitive Blind Spots and The Cyclicality of Investment:
Experimental Evidence
Cortney S. Rodent
Ohio University

Andrew Smyth
Marquette University, andrew.smyth@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_fac
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Rodent, Cortney S. and Smyth, Andrew, "Competitive Blind Spots and The Cyclicality of Investment:
Experimental Evidence" (2020). Economics Faculty Research and Publications. 610.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_fac/610

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications/College of Business
Administration
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION.
Access the published version via the link in the citation below.
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 87, No. 1 (July 2020): 274-315. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without express
permission from Wiley.

Competitive Blind Spots and The Cyclicality of
Investment: Experimental Evidence
Cortney S. Rodent

Department of Economics, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

Andrew Smyth

Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Abstract

We report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of profit‐enhancing investment in
a competitive environment. In our setting, optimal investment is counter‐cyclical when investment
costs fall following market downturns. However, we do not observe counter‐cyclical investment.
Instead, we see much less strategic behavior than our rational investment model anticipates. Our
participants exhibit what Porter (1980) terms a competitive blind spot, and heuristic investment
models where individuals invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity, or a fixed percentage of
anticipated market demand, better fit our data than does optimal investment. We also report a control
treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity. Both of these
extensions support our main result.
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INTRODUCTION

For many economists, recessions are the worst of times, they are the best of times. To be sure,
they are not desired, yet they are often viewed with a Schumpeterian silver lining as times of cleansing
and reorganization. On this outlook, low investment costs and low investment opportunity costs during
downturns spur firms to invest counter‐cyclically.[1] The business press also lauds counter‐cyclical
investment, emphasizing the "risk of not investing while the economy is weak" (Ghemawat, 1993) and
touting recessions as "one of the finest opportunities an innovation‐driven business can have"
(Vossoughi, 2012).
Our research is motivated by the fact that aggregate research and development (R&D)
investment is, in fact, procyclical.[2] This well‐documented result (Barlevy, 2007) belies the
Schumpeterian story and suggests that managers may invest suboptimally during recessions. Possible
explanations for this result include the presence of binding liquidity constraints (Aghion et al., 2012), of
high R&D adjustment costs (Brown and Petersen, 2011), and of the lack of full appropriability of much
R&D (Barlevy, 2007). But precisely identifying the effect of falling investment costs on investment is
challenging since firms face declining market revenues at the same time that their investment costs
fall.[3] With an experiment, we can precisely examine the cyclicality of investment.
A more general motivation for our research is the paucity of experiments examining
competition in the presence of frequent, exogenous cost changes. There is some extant experimental
research on exogenous supply shifts in Double Auction environments (see Williams, 1979; Williams and
Smith, 1984), and on competition with endogenous cost changes in posted‐offer settings (see Isaac and
Reynolds, 1992; Darai et al., 2010; Sacco and Schmutzler, 2011; Smyth, 2016; Aghion et al., 2018).[4]
But to the best of our knowledge, only one paper (Davis et al., 1993) has directly considered the effects
of exogenous cost changes on competition in a nonauction environment.[5]
Our experimental environment abstracts essential features of firms' investment decisions. In
our motivating duopoly model, recessions make investing in future profits cheaper so that optimal
investment is counter‐cyclical. In our experimental design, investment cost changes are not subtle, and
they are timed to permit clean identification of counter‐cyclical investment—if it occurs. We make
investment half as costly following a recessionary period as after an expansionary period in our Cost
Change treatment.
Surprisingly, average participant investment does not spike with cost reductions in Cost
Change. Our participants' response to the cost change is 15% of that predicted by our model. On
average, our participants over‐invest during market expansions when investment costs are relatively
high, and under‐invest following recessions when investment costs are relatively low. We find it
striking that we observe little counter‐cyclical investment in our stylized experiment with such stark
investment cost changes.
Our data suggest that many participants exhibit bounded rationality and what Porter (1980)
terms a blind spot, as they "will either not see the significance of events (such as a strategic move) at

all, will perceive them incorrectly, or will perceive them only very slowly." On average, the rules‐of‐
thumb invest a fixed percentage of liquidity and invest a fixed percentage of the market forecast fit our
data much better than the optimal investment path does.
Because liquidity appears to play a crucial role in how participants make investments in
our Cost Change treatment, we report a Liquidity treatment with asymmetric liquidity constraints. If
participants use liquidity‐based heuristics when investing, we should observe large differences in
investment across liquidity types. We do in fact find that participants who are randomly endowed with
either low‐ or high‐ liquidity make decisions that are consistent with a liquidity‐based investment
heuristic.
In sum, incentivized individuals in our competitive investment environment act less strategically
than our rational investment model predicts. Our data thus buttress the Carnegie School's (Simon,
1955; Cyert, March, 1992) seminal behavioral contributions to industrial organization and the theory of
the firm. Of course, discrepancies between theory and data are par for the experimental economic
course. What is novel here is our competitive investment setting—one with stark incentives for
counter‐cyclical investment, yet one with little counter‐cyclical investment actually observed.
More broadly, our paper contributes to several other literatures. Our experimental markets are
extended and contextualized proportional‐prize contests, so the paper adds to the growing
experimental contest literature.[6] We mostly frame our paper in microeconomic terms, but it is also
related to the burgeoning experimental macroeconomics literature. In particular, it corresponds to
previous macroeconomic experiments examining expectations, forecasting, and feedback (Assenza et
al., 2014) as well as decision‐making in dynamic environments (Duffy, 2015). Finally, to the extent that
our results are externally valid, they contribute to the literature on the cyclicality of investment.[7]
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our motivating model. Section 3
conveys our experimental design and procedures, and the optimal investment path in our experiments.
We next report our experimental results in Section 4, beginning with our baseline No Cost
Change treatment and our Cost Change treatment. Then we discuss possible reasons why our data are
not consistent with our optimal investment model and report results from our Liquidity treatment.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.

MOTIVATING MODEL

In this section, we present a model that guides our experimental design and which we
reference when reporting our experimental results. Our motivating model is stylized, but it
incorporates several important features of profit‐enhancing investment: (a) Investment today affects
profit tomorrow, (b) Market demand and investment costs are related, and (c) Investment liquidity is
constrained.
Our model assumes two firms engaged in profit‐enhancing investment competition.[8] Time is
finite and composed of periods indexed by 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑇𝑇 is the model's final period. Firms earn
revenue 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , where 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 denotes the firm's market share in Period 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is the value of the
market in that period. The firm's market share is determined according to:

′ )
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
=

(1)

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
′
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1

′
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 is the firm's investment in Period 𝑡𝑡 − 1, and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
is their rival's investment in the same
period. Thus, each firm's market share is their investment last period divided by the total market
investment last period.[9]

Note from the functions given above that revenue is increasing in market share and thus also
increasing in investment. However, firms bear costs associated with their investments. The firm's
investment cost in Period 𝑡𝑡 is 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 1 )𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , where Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 1 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 1 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 2. To capture
counter‐cyclical investment costs, we assume that:
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 = �

(2)

𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻
𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿

if Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 ≥ 0
if Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 < 0

where 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 > 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 > 0. In other words, when Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 1 < 0, investing gets cheaper.

Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the cost change. Cost changes take effect one period after a
recession.[10] At the beginning of each period, the firms observe the value of the economy, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , and
their investment cost coefficient, 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 1 ). Both firms then simultaneously make investments 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ,
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 . The coefficient 𝜙𝜙 affects the firm's liquidity. In other words, firms must choose
investments that are less than or equal to their current liquidity‐adjusted revenues. Finally, the next
period begins, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1 is observed, and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 1 is realized.

Figure 1 Timeline for investment cost change

We construct a symmetric, optimal investment path over all periods in the model by backwards
induction. In Period 𝑇𝑇, the firm simply receives revenue 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 = 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 and the game ends, so the final
investment decisions occur in Period 𝑇𝑇 − 1. The firm's profit maximization problem is identical in all
periods between Period 2 and Period 𝑇𝑇 − 1. The two‐period problem is:
(3)

max 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 )𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ )𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] + 𝜆𝜆(𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
{𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥}

where we assume no discounting and where 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0 is a Kuhn‐Tucker multiplier.

Because 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 1 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ) is increasing at a decreasing rate in 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , while the cost of investing
increases at a constant rate, optimal investment will not exhaust the firm's liquidity (i.e., 𝜆𝜆 = 0) for a

sufficiently large liquidity level. We construct an optimal investment path where liquidity is not
exhausted in any period. Differentiating (3) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 and setting 𝜆𝜆 = 0 yields:
This becomes:

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′
−𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 ) +
𝐄𝐄 [𝑀𝑀 ] = 0
(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ )2 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+1
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ) = �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ �

(4)

𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
� 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′
(Δ𝑀𝑀
)
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡−1

Imposing symmetry (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ), 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ) and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡′ (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) imply that:
(5)

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ =

𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
4𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 )

Equation (4) is illustrated in Figure 2. There are two distinct regions in the plot that can be
thought of in terms of a firm's expectations about its rival's investment. When a firm anticipates their
rival investing above the optimal investment (𝑥𝑥 ∗ ), they should respond in the opposite direction.
However, when a firm anticipates their rival investing below 𝑥𝑥 ∗ , they should respond in the same
direction. So investments are neither purely strategic complements nor purely strategic substitutes in
this environment.

Figure 2 Example best response curve

Note two opposing effects in Equation (5): Ceteris paribus, investment increases in the market
demand forecast (𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]) and decreases in the cost parameter (𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ). The value of the market is
assumed to be autoregressive of order 1, AR(1). Its value in Period 𝑡𝑡 is 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 − 1 + Є𝑡𝑡 ,

where 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜌𝜌 are constants and Є𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎 2 ). Note that because the noise term is mean
zero, 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 . On our optimal investment path, investing 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ in Period 𝑡𝑡 allows the firm
to invest optimally in Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 (in expectation).[11]

At this point, we can precisely define "cyclical investment" and "counter‐cyclical investment" in
our specific experimental setting.[12] When 𝛼𝛼 = 1, optimal investment increases when market
demand is expected to increase, and it decreases when market demand is expected to decrease
("cyclical"). On the other hand, optimal investment increases sharply in the first period for which 𝛼𝛼 <
1 ("counter‐cyclical"). Depending on the length of the recession, optimal investment may remain
higher than it otherwise would be with 𝛼𝛼 = 1 for several periods. As we discuss in Section 3, in one of
our experimental treatments (No Cost Change), optimal investment is always cyclical; in our other two
treatments, counter‐cyclical investments are optimal immediately following market downturns.
Our model can be viewed as a kind of proportional‐prize contest (Long and Vousden, 1987;
Cason et al., 2010). In a standard proportional‐prize contest, players compete for a prize by putting
forth costly effort. They receive shares of the prize in proportion to their individual effort over the sum
of all effort. Our model modifies this canonical structure to incorporate several "stylized facts" about
investment.
Since investments take time to generate revenue, investment in the current period (𝑡𝑡) affects a
player's share of the prize in the next period (𝑡𝑡 + 1)—not the current period. Because investment
revenue may vary over the course of the business cycle, the contest prize varies period‐to‐period. To
incorporate the fact that the cost of investing varies over the course of the business cycle, the cost of
effort varies period‐to‐period. Finally, since firm liquidity may vary over the course of the business
cycle, the maximum feasible effort varies period‐to‐period.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

This section describes our experimental design and explains how we conducted our
experiments. To translate our motivating model into an experiment, we set the cost parameter so
that 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 1.0 and 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 = 0.5, and we use the same, pre‐drawn market path in each of our
experimental sessions. This path is randomly realized with 𝑀𝑀1 = 128 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1 = 10 + 0.9𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 +
Є𝑡𝑡 , where Є𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 100).

Periods 1–30 of the market path are shown in Figure 3 (the lighter, thicker line), along with the
optimal investment path (the darker, thinner line). In Period 1, optimal investment is 𝑥𝑥1∗ ≈ 31 and each
participant can invest 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 64. Market demand is presented in experimental currency units (ECUs)
and it attains a minimum value of 116 ECUs in Periods 3 and 8 and a maximum value of 173 ECUs in
Period 28.[13] For the 30 periods shown in the figure, the market has 19 expansionary and 11
recessionary periods (the low cost periods are shown in gray in Figure 3).

Figure 3 Market demand and optimal investment by period

Our experiments were conducted with 166 participants at a mid‐sized liberal arts university.
They were run in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) with our participants recruited via proprietary recruitment
software. Each session included approximately 15 min of instructions, which are produced in full in
Appendix C. On average, across all of our treatments, participants earned $23.30 (this includes a $7.00
show‐up fee).
We conducted three treatments: No Cost Change, Cost Change, and Liquidity. Table 1 provides
information about each treatment. Our treatments were programmed to run for a maximum of 50
periods, but our participants were told only that the experiment would last for "many periods."[14] We
ran each session for as long as possible, conditional on finishing the session within 2 hr. As Table 1
shows, sessions featured between 21 and 39 investment decisions ("Periods"). After participants made
what, unbeknownst to them was their final investment decision, they were informed that the session
was over. Their payment included their revenue from market demand in the next period (i.e.,
Period 𝑇𝑇 in the model in Section 2).

1 TABLE Experiment summary
Treatment
Cost change Liquidity
Session Participants
′
No Cost Change No
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ = 1.00 I
22
′
No
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ = 1.00 II
24
46
Cost Change
Yes
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ′ = 1.00 I
24
′
Yes
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ = 1.00 II
24
′
Yes
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ = 1.00 III
24
72
′
Liquidity
Yes
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ = 0.75 I
24
Yes
ϕ = 1.00, ϕ′ = 0.75 II
24
48
Total
166

Markets
11
12
23
12
12
12
36
12
12
24
83

Periods
38
30
21
30
26
39
30

In all three treatments, each participant made investment decisions every period. Our program
randomly assigned participants to duopolies prior to the experiment and they remained in the same
duopoly throughout the experiment. During the experiment, participants could test out investments
before making their actual investment decision. They did so by entering a "hypothetical" investment
for themselves and their rival, and a hypothetical value for market demand into an on‐screen
calculator. The calculator returned a market share and a market return based on the entered values; it
did not include a "best response" option.
When participants were ready to make their actual investment, they entered their chosen
investment and predictions about the other participant's investment ("paired participant's
investment") and about market demand.[15] The rival investment and market demand predictions
were not incentivized. We felt that incorporating an incentive‐compatible belief elicitation mechanism
into our already complex design would be too taxing on our participants.
Figure 4 is a screenshot of the experimental decision screen. As the figure shows, participants'
screens gave them the complete history of market demand, their market share, their market revenue
("return"), their investment, their rival's investment ("paired participant's investment"), past cost
parameters, investment costs, period profits, and their cumulative profit.

Figure 4 Experiment screenshot [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

We exogenously varied the cost parameter, 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 , and the liquidity parameter, 𝜙𝜙, across our three
treatments. No Cost Change is our control treatment. It was identical to our other treatments in every
respect, except that the cost parameter on investment did not vary with market demand. In other
words, 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 was equal to 1.0 in every period. Cost Change is our baseline treatment. Cost
Change participants had symmetric liquidity, and as described in Section 2, investment costs changed
following market "recessions" with a one‐period lag.
Our third treatment, Liquidity, is identical to our other treatments except that one of the two
duopolists in each market had 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75, so that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ≤ 0.75𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡′ . The asymmetric liquidity constraints
were private information (participants were only told their own liquidity constraint and were told
nothing about their rival's liquidity). As the experiment progressed, the 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 duopolist could infer
that their rival was more liquidity constrained (and vice versa) from the history of investment decisions
and outcomes on their screen. Participants saw total market demand, their own return, and the

investment of their paired participant for each past period on their screen (see Figure 4). From this
information, they could calculate their paired participant's return and so could potentially "back out"
their paired participant's liquidity constraint.
The model in Section 2 motivates several investment hypotheses.
1 Hypothesis No Cost Change investment will be positively correlated with next period's expected
market value.
This hypothesis follows directly from Equation (5) in Section 2. In No Cost Change, the cost
parameter, αt, is always unity, so optimal investment is solely a function of next period's expected
market value (𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]). When the market forecast increases, investment should increase, and vice
versa.
2 Hypothesis Cost Change investment will be negatively correlated with the cost parameter.

Hypothesis 2 also follows immediately from Equation (5). In Cost Change, the cost parameter
varies between 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 1.0 and 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 = 0.5. Holding constant the expected market value, optimal
investment doubles across periods when the cost parameter changes from 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 to 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿 . After the market
value declines, the cost parameter changes, and investment should spike as shown in Figure 3.
3 Hypothesis Liquidity investment will be positively correlated with the liquidity parameter. For
participants with high liquidity, investment will be negatively correlated with the cost
parameter.

This hypothesis states that 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants will invest more than 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants.
We intentionally designed Liquidity to be as similar as possible to Cost Change. The only difference
between the two treatments was that "100%" was replaced by "75%" in the text of the 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75
participants' instructions (see Appendix C). Previous contest experiments show an "endowment effect"
or a "spending heuristic" where chosen effort scales with the endowment of effort (Sheremeta, 2011;
Brookins et al., 2015). So we anticipate a "liquidity effect" where observed investment increases in the
feasible amount of investment.
Furthermore, participants with 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 are hypothesized to vary their investment according
to the cost parameter in line with Equation (5). To the extent that 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants are liquidity
constrained, we hypothesize that their investment is less sensitive to changes in the cost parameter
and more sensitive to changes in the market value.

RESULTS

Our presentation of the experimental data begins visually. Figure 5 shows the time series of
average investment (in ECUs). Panel (a) contains the No Cost Change data and Panel (b) shows the Cost
Change data. Vertical gray bars indicate periods where 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 0.5 in Cost Change, and we include bars
in the No Cost Change figure for comparison purposes, even though the investment cost coefficient did
not change in No Cost Change.

Figure 5 Average investment by period, by treatment

Figure 5a shows that, on average, actual No Cost Change investment tracked the optimal
investment path fairly well but was consistently above it. On the basis of Figure 5, the optimal
investment path plausibly organizes the No Cost Change data, but there is clear evidence of over‐
investment. The same cannot be said for the Cost Change data. Figure 5b reveals that, on average,
actual Cost Change investment was above the optimal investment path when 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 1.0 and below the
optimal path when 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = 0.5.
We now examine No Cost Change and Cost Change investment more rigorously with regression
analysis. Our estimating specification is[16]:

(6)

Δ ln�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 � = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝛽2 Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝛽3 Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + Є𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡

where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is average investment at the market level (m indexes duopoly markets), 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 is
the exogenous forecast of market demand displayed on each participant's screen, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is the market‐
level cost coefficient in Period 𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 equals 1 if neither participant in market 𝑚𝑚 is so liquidity‐
constrained that they cannot invest the optimal investment in Period 𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ ), and equals 0 otherwise,
and Є𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is an error term.[17]

Our experimental design ensures that any two markets are independent, so
that Є𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 and Є𝑚𝑚′,𝑡𝑡 are independent. However, autocorrelation is an obvious concern
since Є𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 and Є𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 are not independent, so we first‐difference our specification (note that this
removes any time‐invariant, unobserved market or session heterogeneity). However, Wooldridge Tests
reject null hypotheses of no autocorrelation for each treatment, so we also employ Driscoll‐Kraay
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, cross‐sectional correlation, and autocorrelation.

We estimate specification (6) for each treatment by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with
the Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors. For the No Cost Change treatment, Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ) = 0 for all periods.
Before reporting the regression results, we note that estimating specification (6) with optimal
investment (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ ) as the dependent variable results in the coefficient estimates 𝛽𝛽̂1∗ = 1.00 and 𝛽𝛽̂2∗ =
−1.00 for Cost Change.

Table 2 shows regression results for the No Cost Change and Cost Change treatments. All the
coefficient estimates on Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) are significantly different from 0, but none are significantly
different from 1. Thus, in both No Cost Change and Cost Change, we estimate that a 1% change in the
market demand forecast leads to a 1% change in investment, in the same direction.
2 TABLE Regression results
𝚫𝚫 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒎𝒎, 𝒕𝒕 ) No Cost Change
Constant
−0.00
(0.01)
Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) 1.00***
(0.24)
Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 )
Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅 2
Observations

0.02
755

Cost Change
0.00
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.89*** 1.15***
(0.25)
(0.27)
0.33***
(0.10)
0.10
0.03
755
888

0.01
(0.01)
1.28***
(0.27)
−0.08***
(0.03)
0.04
888

0.01
(0.01)
1.28***
(0.27)
−0.15***
(0.05)
0.07*
(0.04)
0.05
888

Note: Pooled OLS coefficient estimates with Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors in parenthesis.
* Statistical significance <.10.
** Statistical significance <.05.
*** Statistical significance <.01.

For Cost Change, we estimate that lowering investment costs increases investment. However,
our estimate of the effect of lowering investment costs by half is only 15% of that predicted by our
motivating model (−0.15/−1.00). In Appendix A, we estimate specification (6) using only data from the
minimum number of periods in both treatments across sessions (30 for No Cost Change and 21 for Cost
Change). Using this sample, the estimated effect of lowering investment costs by half in Cost Change is
13% of that predicted by our motivating model.[18]
From the preceding analysis, we conclude:
1 Result In No Cost Change, average investment exceeded optimal investment.
2 Result In Cost Change, average investment exceeded optimal investment when 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0 and was
less than optimal investment when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5.

Our data clearly do not support Hypothesis 2. We interpret Result 1 as a manifestation of the
"overbidding" phenomenon that is frequently observed in experimental contests (Sheremeta, 2013;
Dechenaux et al., 2015). In Cost Change, participants over‐invest when 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0 as in No Cost Change,
but under‐invest when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5. Why do the data not support Hypothesis 2?

Suboptimal investment in Cost Change

We now consider possible explanations for our No Cost Change and Cost Change results:
Participants were confused, participants cooperated (or, if you prefer, colluded), participants did not
use the "rational" forecast, and participants did not view their investment problem game theoretically
but in some other way.

Confusion
Perhaps participants did not understand that investment costs change, did not understand how
costs change, or that costs change for both participants. Our complete instructions are presented in
Appendix C. They cover the cost change at length and include stark reminders such as: "When market
demand falls, investment costs fall." Moreover, as Figure 4 shows, participants saw their investment
cost parameter (𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ) on their computer screen. We have no evidence that participants were not aware
of, or did not understand the investment cost changes, and as we detail below, our data are not well‐fit
by assuming that participants ignored the cost changes.[19]
More generally, when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5, a participant's best response curve "shifts out." Given this, a
participant must believe that their rival will either drastically increase or reduce their investment
before said participant will not want to increase their own investment when their own cost parameter
falls to 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5. Such extreme beliefs are inconsistent with the participants' reported expectations
about their rival's investment (see Figure 7).[20]

Cooperation
Did participants cooperate with their supposed rival? There are a small number of No Cost
Change and Cost Change markets where participants clearly "cooperated." However, there is
considerable heterogeneity across markets; there were markets where investment fell over time, but
also markets where investment escalated over time. See Figures A2–A8 in Appendix A for the time
series of average investment in all of our experimental markets. On average, as Figure 5 clearly shows,
participants were supracompetitive in No Cost Change and in Cost Change when 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0.
There is a simple, straightforward reason to doubt cooperation as an explanation for our
results. If participants employed any sort of cooperative strategy, we should see actual, average
investments below the optimal, noncooperative investment paths in Figure 5. But we find the exact
opposite. In particular, the observed No Cost Change data in Figure 5a simply do not suggest
cooperation.[21]

Nonrational expectations
In Equation (5), optimal investment is a function of the forecast of next period's market
demand and the cost parameter. In 8 of the first 10 periods (and in 16 of the first 20 periods) actual
market demand exceeded the rational forecast, 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] = 10 + 0.9𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 . This potentially influenced
our participants to employ a nonrational, alternative forecast.[22] To examine this possibility, we
calculate optimal investment under three counterfactual forecasting assumptions: (1) Participants are
able to perfectly forecast next period's actual market demand (𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1 ), (2) Participants
forecast according to the unincentivized demand forecasts they submit when entering their investment
levels, and (3) Participants forecast using adaptive learning. Assumptions (1) and (2) are self‐
explanatory, but assumption (3) requires elaboration.
Following the adaptive learning literature in macroeconomics (see Evans and Honkapohja,
2001), we suppose that our participants' perceived law of motion for market demand was:

(7)

𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡

with 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 unknown to the participant and where 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 is an error term. Of course,
participants were told that 𝑎𝑎 = 10 and 𝑏𝑏 = 0.9, but perhaps—for whatever reason—they formed
their own beliefs about the value of these two parameters. We assume that in each Period 𝑡𝑡,
participants estimated 𝑎𝑎� and 𝑏𝑏� by least squares, using all available past market data up to Period 𝑡𝑡,
or {𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 }𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 .[23] Their assumed forecast of demand in Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is then 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 .

Figure 6 shows optimal investment under our three counterfactual forecasting assumptions and
assuming the rational forecast. The average of each counterfactual forecast was substituted into
Equation (5) to obtain the optimal investment time series. It is clear from the figure that assuming
nonrational forecasting, but maintaining Equation (5), does not generate investment paths that fit the
data well, because the counterfactual forecasts imply optimal investments that are essentially identical
to the optimal investment implied by rational forecasting.

Figure 6 Optimal investment by period, by forecast assumption [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Heuristics
In Figure 7, participants' expectations about their rivals' investment (the dashed lines) are fairly
consistent with their rivals' actual investment in No Cost Change and Cost Change.[24] The figure
suggests that our participants made their investment decisions by some other calculus than maximizing
Equation (3), because actual and expected investment are so similar and neither match the optimal
investment path in either treatment. If our participants were boundedly rational and did not invest
optimally—according to our game theoretic model's notion of optimality, how might they have made
their investment decisions?

Figure 7 Expectations by period, by treatment [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

The theory of selective attention provides a possible explanation (Hanna et al., 2014;
Schwartzstein, 2014).[25] If attention is costly, important economic variables may be neglected in favor
of others that are less informative, but which are more easily noticed. Agents may optimize along more
the noticeable dimensions, while failing to optimize along the most important dimensions.
In our experiment, participants may be attentive to exogenous variables such as past market
demand or the forecast of future market demand. Or they may be attentive to their current liquidity or
their rivals' past investment, but not to their future liquidity or their rivals' future investment. Figure 4
shows that all of the above information is prominently displayed on participants' decision screens. If
participants are selectively attentive they have a competitive blind spot and "will either not see the
significance of events (such as a strategic move) at all, will perceive them incorrectly, or will perceive
them only very slowly" (Porter, 1980).
Selectively attentive participants will not determine investment according to Equation (5), but
may instead apply heuristics ("rules‐of‐thumb") to the variables within their focus. A number of
possible investment heuristics seem reasonable in our setting.[26] We consider the following rules‐of‐
thumb:

(8)

''Ignore Cost'' Assume the cost parameter always equals1: 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]/4
′
''Imitation''Match my rival's lagged investment: 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
''Forecast%''Invest a fixed percentage of the market forecast: 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
''Liquidity%''Invest a fixed percentage of liquidity: 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡

While invest a fixed percentage of current market demand is another reasonable heuristic,
current market demand and the market forecast are collinear so they have nearly identical predictive
power as heuristics.[27] For comparison purposes, we also consider the optimal investment path
(Optimal).
The strategies Optimal and Imitation consider the participant's rival, though Imitation is
backwards‐looking—it considers what the rival did, not what they will or what they might do. On the
other hand, Ignore Cost, Forecast%, and Liquidity% ignore the rival and only concern the participant's
own situation or the exogenous market situation. These latter three heuristics are consistent with

selective attention: the participant focuses on rivals' past investment, or on the market forecast, or on
their own liquidity.
To assess the Forecast% and Liquidity% heuristics, the coefficients 𝜆𝜆 and 𝛾𝛾 from (8) are
estimated separately for each participant using ordinary least squares regressions. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the
dependent variable in each regression, there is no constant term, and the sole regressor in each
specification is either 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 or is Firm 𝑖𝑖's liquidity in 𝑡𝑡. Finally, the estimating sample includes
Periods 1–30, except for the two Cost Change sessions which include 21 and 26 total periods.

Figure 8 shows kernel densities by treatment and participant type for 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 (Figure 8a)
and 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖 (Figure 8b). The average values of 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖 over all participants (denoted 𝜆𝜆̅ and 𝛾𝛾̅ ) are reported
in Table 3. We use Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests to assess whether differences exist in the distributions
of 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖 across No Cost Change and Cost Change. To satisfy an independence assumption of the
test, we average estimates at the market level (𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 23, 𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 = 36). According to the tests, there is
no difference across No Cost Change and Cost Change for the distributions of 𝜆𝜆 estimates (𝑝𝑝 = .185),
but there is a difference for the distributions of 𝛾𝛾 estimates (𝑝𝑝 = .086).

Figure 8 Kernel densities [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

3 TABLE Heuristic comparison
Treatment
No Cost Change

Optimal Ignore Cost Imitation Forecast% Liquidity%
Mean RMSE 27.90
41.81
18.10
14.73
n out of 46 0
5
14
27
𝜆𝜆̅ = 0.31 𝛾𝛾̅ = 0.57
Cost Change
Mean RMSE 28.97
27.08
38.72
18.38
14.03
n out of 72 1
0
4
15
52
̅𝜆𝜆 = 0.35 𝛾𝛾̅ = 0.67
Liquidity (ϕ = 1.00) Mean RMSE 33.98
34.81
46.62
20.49
18.45
n out of 24 0
0
1
10
13
𝜆𝜆̅ = 0.43 𝛾𝛾̅ = 0.61
Liquidity (ϕ = 0.75) Mean RMSE 30.52
21.02
47.99
13.36
7.11
n out of 24 0
0
0
2
22
̅𝜆𝜆 = 0.21 𝛾𝛾̅ = 0.75
Note: Mean RMSE is averaged over all participants by treatment and participant type. "n out of X" is how many
times the strategy had the lowest RMSE among the four candidate strategies. Comparisons should be made
across columns, but not across rows.

a

Relative to optimal investment in Cost Change.

Table 3 shows the average root‐mean‐square‐error (RMSE) for each investment strategy
relative to actual investment. For each strategy, a count of the number of participants whose lowest
RMSE was that strategy is also presented. So, for example, Liquidity% generates the lowest RMSE for
72% (52/72) of Cost participants. For each treatment and participant type, Liquidity% fits the actual
investment data better than the alternative strategies, though Forecast% also outperforms the optimal
investment path. The former heuristic suggests that, on average, No Cost Change participants invested
57% of their liquidity and that Cost Change participants invested 67% of their liquidity each period.
Our analysis leads us to conclude:
3 Result The heuristics invest a fixed percentage of the market forecast and invest a fixed percentage of
liquidity better fit our No Cost Change and Cost Change data than does optimal investment.
How well does the Liquidity% heuristic match the data visually? Figure 9 compares actual
investment, optimal investment, and investment assuming that each participant invested 57% (67%) of
their liquidity in No Cost Change (Cost Change). Because liquidity appears to play a crucial role in our
participants' investment decisions, we now report a treatment with asymmetric liquidity constraints.

Figure 9 Heuristic investment by period, by treatment [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

The effect of liquidity on investment

In this section, we consider the effects of exogenous liquidity asymmetry on investment in our
experimental environment. In Liquidity, one duopolist could invest 1.00Rt each period, whereas their
rival could only invest 0.75𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡′ each period. The asymmetric liquidity constraints did not preclude
participants from investing according to the optimal investment for Cost Change, if participants had
always previously invested the optimal amount.
While Liquidity participants were not informed about the asymmetric constraints on investment
in the instructions, market history was reported on their screen. Before data collection, we
hypothesized that observed investment would be related to the liquidity constraint (Hypothesis 3). In
light of our conclusion that many No Cost Change and Cost Change participants use the rule‐of‐

thumb invest a fixed percentage of liquidity, we certainly expect a difference in investment across 𝜙𝜙 =
1.00 participants and 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants.

Figure 10 shows both average investment over time and average expected investment over
time. The solid time series are for actual investment and the dashed investment paths are those
predicted by the Liquidity% heuristic (see Table 3). Clearly, 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants invested more on
average than did 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants. In per period terms, they invested 59.0 ECUs compared to
28.4 ECUs for ϕ = 0.75 participants.[28] For comparison, Cost Change participants invested 47.5 ECUs
on average.[29]

Figure 10 Investment and expectations by period, Liquidity treatment [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

As we do for our other treatments, we present time series for average expectations in Liquidity.
Figure 10b shows that 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants' expectations about their rivals' investment were, on
average, good because the dashed line showing 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 expected investment tracks 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75
actual investment very closely (especially after Period 15). However, 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants
consistently underestimated their rivals' investments. On average, they predicted that ϕ = 1.00
participants would invest 44.6 ECUs. This figure was above their own average maximum liquidity (37.0
ECUs), but was slightly less than their own average return of 49.3 ECUs. We suspect that their
prediction about their 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 rival was influenced by their own return.[30]
Table 4 presents estimates of specification (6) (and two additional, simpler specifications)
with Liquidity data pooled over 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 and 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants. Across the three specifications
in Table 4, the response to forecast demand is much lower in magnitude than in No Cost
Change or Cost Change. When we control for the feasibility of the optimal investment level, the
estimated coefficient on Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ) of −0.13 is very close to the −0.15 estimate for Cost Change.[31]
4 TABLE Regression results
𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫 (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒎𝒎, 𝒕𝒕 ) Liquidity
Constant
0.01
(0.01)
Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) 0.44**
(0.19)
Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 )

0.01
(0.01)
0.50***
(0.18)
−0.04

0.01
(0.01)
0.45**
(0.17)
−0.13***

Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅 2
Observations

(0.03)
0.01
804

0.01
804

(0.04)
0.13***
(0.04)
0.03
804

Note: Pooled OLS coefficient estimates with Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors in parenthesis.
*Statistical significance <.10.
** Statistical significance <.05.
*** Statistical significance <.01.

Table 3 contains Liquidity comparisons of the same heuristics previously reported for No Cost
Change and Cost Change. As in those treatments, the Liquidity% rule‐of‐thumb has the lowest average
RMSE. Forecast% and Liquidity% explain the data roughly as well for 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants; Forecast%
has the lowest RMSE for 10 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants, whereas Liquidity% has the lowest RMSE for 13
participants. On the other hand, Liquidity% has the lowest RMSE for 22 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants (92% of
all such participants). Because 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 participants were liquidity‐constrained, this result is hardly
surprising.
A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test indicates a significant difference between the distribution
of 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 for Liquidity 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 participants and the analogous distribution for Liquidity 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75
participants (𝑝𝑝 = .000; 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿1.00 = 24, 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿0.75 = 24). It also suggests a significant difference in the
distribution of 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖 across participant types (𝑝𝑝 = .013). However, the distribution of 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 for 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00
participants is not significantly different from the distribution of 𝜆𝜆̂𝑖𝑖 for Cost Change markets (𝑝𝑝 =
.106; 𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶 = 36, 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿1.00 = 24). Nor is the distribution of 𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖 significantly different across Liquidity 𝜙𝜙 =
1.00 participants and Cost Change markets (𝑝𝑝 = .269).

This last test result is very interesting. Our Cost Change participants and
our Liquidity participants who were randomly selected for the 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 role were from the same
participant population and they saw the exact same instructions (see Appendix C). However, they
faced very different competitive conditions. If both sets of participants made their investments a
function of the competitiveness of their markets, we might expect a significant difference in estimated
heuristics across the two treatments because Cost Change participants competed with equally‐liquid
rivals, whereas 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 Liquidity participants had a decided liquidity advantage. Our finding of no
difference suggests that participants in both treatments had a Porterian blind spot to their
competition, because Forecast% and Liquidity% are not functions of competition—at least not directly.
We can report that:

4 Result In Liquidity, average investment was positively related to liquidity.
5 Result Liquidity ϕ = 1.00 participants and Cost Change participants invested similar percentages of
their liquidity, whereas ϕ = 0.75 participants invested significantly more of their liquidity.
We now summarize our results and conclude.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Standard economic theory and business sentiment both tout the virtues of counter‐cyclical
investment. Yet in an important and well‐studied case (research and development investment),
observed investment is procyclical. In this paper, we report novel laboratory experiments examining
profit‐enhancing investment competition over a business cycle, and more generally, exploring how
frequent cost changes affect market competition. Our experimental approach lets us investigate these
questions in a controlled fashion.
In our Cost Change treatment, optimal investment is counter‐cyclical immediately following a
recessionary period, yet observed investment is decidedly not. On average, our data are better fit by
assuming that participants invest a fixed percentage of the market demand forecast or a fixed
percentage of their liquidity, than by supposing that they invest according to a game‐theoretic
investment path. Our participants appear to use investment heuristics, and either do not incorporate
the strategic implications of cost changes into their decision‐making at all, or do so only modestly.
To further explore the use of heuristics in investment competition, we report
a Liquidity treatment which is identical to our Cost Change treatment in every respect, save for
asymmetric liquidity constraints. Our Liquidity participants make investment decisions that are
consistent with a liquidity‐based investment heuristic. Participants who are randomly‐endowed with
relatively high liquidity invest more than their rivals who are randomly‐endowed with relatively low
liquidity.
Many industrial organization experiments explore demand shocks and market competition (see
Potters and Suetens, 2013), but we are aware of only one other nonauction experiment (Davis et al.,
1993) that directly examines the effects of frequent cost changes on market competition. Our paper
contributes to the behavioral industrial organization literature (see Ellison, 2006; Armstrong and Huck,
2014; Grubb and Tremblay, 2015) by providing empirical examples of how bounded rationality can
affect competition. Our results suggest that profit‐enhancing investments may not be chosen in a
purely "rational" manner with clear regard for rival investment. In the strategy literature, Porter (1980)
terms this a competitive blind spot.
Our environment can be viewed as a sequence of contextualized proportional‐prize contests.
Because contests and Cournot games are related (see Menezes and Quiggin, 2010), we suspect that
our results may generalize to classic Cournot, Bertrand, and Bertrand‐Edgeworth markets with
frequent cost changes. But this is an open empirical question that we believe deserves future
experimental economic attention.
Our data are consistent with results from the experimental contest literature. In all No Cost
Change periods and in Cost Change periods where 𝛼𝛼 = 1.00, average observed investment exceeds
optimal investment. This is further evidence of "overbidding" in experimental contests—even when
the repeated contest is given an explicit investment competition frame, has a stochastic prize,
nonconstant effort costs, and a maximum effort constraint that is history‐dependent.[32] Additionally,
our conclusion that participants employ a liquidity heuristic is in line with previous contest experiments
showing a spending heuristic—observed effort increases in the endowment of effort (Sheremeta,
2011; Brookins et al., 2015).

Finally, to the extent that our results are externally valid, they suggest that procyclical
investments are a function of competitive blind spots—of agents focusing inward more than outward
to determine investments. Even granting that Fortune 500 firms may "think" game theoretically, many
markets contain managers who may employ heuristics (Busenitz and Barney, 1997) and who may be
subject to blind spots.[33] We offer this conclusion tentatively, because individual agents may use
suboptimal investment heuristics, but market competition may select more strategic, more "rational"
(though not necessarily optimal) agents for survival (Alchian, 1950).
This is the first experimental research to consider the cyclicality of profit‐enhancing investment.
Our approach is broad, but our paper suggests a number of intriguing, focused extensions. In
particular, with a larger market of four or six participants, will participants that invest strategically take
market share away from participants who invest heuristically? And if our participants are selectively
attentive, is their focus affected by competitive pressure? In the long‐run, does attention turn to more
strategically‐relevant variables? With open questions like these, we believe that the cyclicality of
investment, and of frequent cost changes in competitive environments, are promising avenues for
future experimental research.
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APPENDIX A

In this appendix, we present robustness checks for the regressions results from Tables 2 and 4.
We use the same specifications but restrict the estimating samples so that they only include data from
the period minima for each treatment, across sessions: 30 periods for No Cost Change, 21 periods
for Cost Change, and 30 periods for Liquidity. We also present comparisons between actual market
demand and the participants' predictions about market demand, and the time series of average
investment for all 83 markets.
TABLE A1 Regression results
𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫 (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒎𝒎, 𝒕𝒕 ) No Cost Change
Constant
−0.01
(0.01)
Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) 1.00***
(0.25)
Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 )
Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡

Estimating sample 1–30
(periods)

Cost Change
−0.00
0.01
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.91*** 1.25***
(0.27)
(0.30)
0.21**
(0.07)
1–30

1–21

0.01
(0.02)
1.37***
(0.32)
−0.06*
(0.03)
1–21

0.01
(0.02)
1.37***
(0.33)
−0.13*
(0.07)
0.07
(0.06)
1–21

𝑅𝑅 2
Observations

0.03
667

0.06
667

0.04
720

0.04
720

0.05
720

Note: Pooled OLS coefficient estimates with Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors in parenthesis.
*Statistical significance <.10.
**Statistical significance <.05.
***Statistical significance <.01.

TABLE A2 Regression results
𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫 (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒎𝒎, 𝒕𝒕 )
Constant
0.01
(0.01)
Δ ln(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ) 0.43*
(0.21)
Δ ln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 )
Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚, 𝑡𝑡

Estimating sample 1–30
(periods)
0.01
𝑅𝑅 2
Observations
696

Liquidity
0.01
(0.01)
0.46**
(0.19)
−0.02
(0.03)
1–30

0.01
(0.01)
0.39**
(0.19)
−0.11**
(0.05)
0.13***
(0.04)
1–30

0.01
696

0.03
696

Note: Pooled OLS coefficient estimates with Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors in parenthesis.
*Statistical significance <.10.
**Statistical significance <.05.
***Statistical significance <.01.

Figure A1 Market demand predictions, by period [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A2 No Cost Change Markets (Session 1) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in
ECUs and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and
optimal investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A3 No Cost Change Markets (Session 2) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in
ECUs and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and
optimal investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A4 Cost Change Markets (Session 1) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in ECUs
and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and optimal
investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A5 Cost Change Markets (Session 2) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in ECUs
and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and optimal
investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A6 Cost Change Markets (Session 3) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in ECUs
and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and optimal
investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A7 Liquidity Markets (Session 1) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in ECUs
and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and optimal
investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure A8 Liquidity Markets (Session 2) In each subfigure, the vertical axis shows Investment in ECUs
and the horizontal axis shows the Period. Average investment is the thicker, lighter line and optimal
investment is the thinner, darker line [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

APPENDIX B

In this appendix, we examine optimal and nonoptimal investment strategies assuming that the
model in Section 2 is either finitely‐repeated or indefinitely‐repeated.

Optimal investment when the model is finitely‐repeated

When the model in Section 2 is finitely‐repeated, we can derive a parameter restriction on
market demand (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ) that must hold so that investing 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ in Period 𝑡𝑡 makes it possible (in expectation)
∗
to invest 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
in Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. We also report the liquidity endowment necessary for 𝑥𝑥1∗ to be feasible
in Period 1.
As explained in Section 2, symmetric optimal investment in any period between Period 2 and
Period 𝑇𝑇 − 1 is:
(B1)

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ =

𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
4𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 )

This optimum is feasible when 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 for both firms.

In any Period 𝑡𝑡 between Period 2 and Period 𝑇𝑇 − 2, the firm must be able to invest according
to Equation (B1). In Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, the firm must also be able to invest according to Equation (B1). So

we must check that, in expectation, investing optimally in Period 𝑡𝑡 will allow the firm to invest
optimally in Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Both of the following inequalities must hold:
∗
∗′ )𝑀𝑀
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑡
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
≤ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗′ )𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]

∗
∗′ )𝑀𝑀
∗
When 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is chosen, 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑡 is known. If both firms invest 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 in Period 𝑡𝑡, they will split
the market in Period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. In other words, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗′ ) = 1/2 , or:

𝜙𝜙
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
≤ � � 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
2

∗
We can also substitute in for 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
using Equation (B1), so that:

This becomes:

𝑬𝑬𝑡𝑡+1 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+2 ]
𝜙𝜙
≤ � � 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
4𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 )
2
𝑬𝑬𝑡𝑡+1 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+2 ]
≤ 2𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 )
𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]

Because 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ] = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 , this is:

𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌(𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 )
≤ 2𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 )
𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡

Rearranging the above, we get:

𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ≥

𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 − 2𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 )
2𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡+1 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ) − 𝜌𝜌2

If this condition on the value of the market is satisfied, a firm can (in expectation) invest the
optimal amount in any two periods 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 between Period 2 and Period 𝑇𝑇 − 2. Given our
experimental parameterization, this condition holds in all such periods. In Period 1, both firms can
invest optimally because 𝑥𝑥1∗ = 31.25 and both firms are endowed with 64.00 to invest.

Investment strategies when the model is finitely‐repeated

In this section, we assume that the model in Section 2 is finitely‐repeated. We contrast optimal
(mutual best‐response) investment and profit with the investments and profits from several alternative
strategies. The strategies we consider are:
''Optimal/Optimal Investment'':𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ =

𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]

4𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 )
1
𝐄𝐄 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
''Cooperative/Cooperative Investment'':𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ = �2� 𝑡𝑡(Δ𝑀𝑀
4𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡−1 )
3
''Heuristic/Heuristic Investment'': 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ = �10� 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]

(B2)

3

''Aggressive/Best‐Response Investment'':𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = �4� 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡

𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ = �𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 �
� − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 )

In other words, Cooperative/Cooperative Investment means that both firms invest half of the
noncooperative, optimal investment. Heuristic/Heuristic Investment entails both firms investing 30% of
expected market demand. Finally, Aggressive/Best‐Response Investment assumes that one firm (the
"aggressor") invests 75% of their liquidity, while their rival best‐responds to this investment. While
these four strategies are hardly exhaustive, they illustrate a variety of potential investment profiles.
Each of the four strategies in Equation (B2) is a function of E𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ], so we must evaluate this
expectation. As in our experiment, we set 𝑀𝑀1 = 128 and 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1 ] = 10 + 0.9𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 . In this section,
we set Mt to be the actual demand path from the experiment. Investments for each of the four
strategies are shown in Figure B9a and the resulting period profits are plotted in Figure B9b. For
Aggressive Investment, the aggressor's investment and profit are graphed.

B9 Investment and profit by period, by strategy [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Note from Figure B9 that Cooperative Investment is always lower than Optimal Investment,
which means that cooperative profits are larger than optimal profits. Recall that Heuristic Investment
does not depend on the cost parameter, 𝛼𝛼. For the particular rule‐of‐thumb we plot (invest 30% of
expected market demand), Heuristic Investment [profit] exceeds Optimal Investment [is smaller than
optimal profit] in all but the low cost periods, where the reverse is true. Finally, Aggressive Investment
is almost always larger than Optimal Investment, so that aggressive profit is almost always smaller than
optimal profit.
This section illustrates a few of the many possible strategies in our experiment. In a finitely‐
repeated setting, only Optimal/Optimal Investment is a mutual best‐response. Other strategies with
low investment levels, such as Cooperative/Cooperative Investment, result in larger profit than does
optimal investment. But on the other hand, Heuristic/Heuristic Investment or an aggressive investment
strategy can result in smaller than optimal profit.

Investment strategies when the model is indefinitely‐repeated

In this section, we assume that the model in Section 2 is indefinitely‐repeated. Because
participants do not know the total number of experimental periods, it is conceivable that they view
their investment decisions as part of an indefinitely‐repeated game.
Consider an indefinite‐horizon version of our motivating model from Section 2. Instead of the
investment game lasting 𝑇𝑇 periods, assume that after each period, there is always a 𝛿𝛿 chance of
1
another period being played. The expected number of periods in this model is 𝑇𝑇�(𝛿𝛿) =
.
1−𝛿𝛿

Letting 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ ) denote profit in period 𝑡𝑡, for a particular continuation probability, 𝛿𝛿, cumulative profit
is:
𝑇𝑇� (𝛿𝛿)

(B3)

Cumulative Profit ≡ � 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡′ )
𝑡𝑡=1

We examine the same strategies that we did when considering the finitely‐repeated model (i.e.,
the strategies in Equation (B2) in Appendix B). However, we now use the ex ante expected path of
market demand for 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 ]. This is a sequence, {128, 125, 123, 120, ...}, that converges to 100.[34]
Figure B10a shows the path of expected market demand. We note that any one randomly drawn
demand path—such as the one we employ in our experiment—need not converge so quickly. The
cumulative profit for Optimal/Optimal Investment, Cooperative/Cooperative Investment,
Heuristic/Heuristic Investment, and Aggressive/Best‐Response Investment (the aggressor's profit is
shown) is graphed on the expected experiment length in Figure B10b. In the indefinitely‐repeated
model, Cooperative/Cooperative Investment is a mutual best‐response if both firms adopt the
following (grim) trigger strategy: Invest the cooperative amount in Period 1 and in every period
thereafter unless your rival invests more than the cooperative amount, in which case invest the optimal
investment amount in every period thereafter. "Defecting" from cooperation involves investing 29 ECUs
in Period 1, and the optimal investment in every period thereafter. The cumulative profit from
defecting corresponds to the dashed, Defection Profit line in Figure B10b. Note that this particular
cooperative investment is preferred to defection when the expected number of periods exceeds one
period.

B10 Indefinitely‐repeated model results [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

This section illustrates that "cooperative" investments can be supported as mutual best‐
responses when the model in Section 2 is indefinitely‐repeated. There are, of course, many alternative
"cooperative," "heuristic," and "aggressive" strategies not considered here that are best‐responses in
the indefinitely‐repeated model.[35]

APPENDIX C

This appendix contains the complete experimental instructions for all three treatments. The No
Cost Change instructions are presented as the default. Changes to the instructions for the Cost
Change participants and for the 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 Liquidity participants are identified by 〈angle brackets 〉.
The 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75 Liquidity participants receive the lone instruction change identified by 〈〈double
angle brackets〉〉.

Introduction

Welcome. You have volunteered to participate in an experiment where your choices will
influence how much real money you earn. Your earnings, including your $7.00 show‐up fee, will be
paid to you privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Please remain quiet and do not communicate with other participants or attempt to observe
their decisions. You will be asked to leave the lab if you violate these rules. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Then click the "Finish Instructions" button when you are ready to move on.

The basics

In today's experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant.
You will interact with this same participant throughout the entire experiment, but your identity will
remain anonymous. This experiment is composed of periods. In each period, you will have funds
available to either keep or invest. Your funds will be denominated in Experimental Currency Units,
or ECUs for short. Sixty ECUs will be worth $1.00 at the end of the experiment.

Investing

Each period, you will decide how much to invest. You will be able to invest as little or as much as
you like, so long as your investment is less than a maximum amount which will depend on your return
from the previous period's investment. Your return on investment will be determined by these three
factors:
The market demand
2. Your investment decision
3. Your paired participant's investment decision
1.

Together, your investment decision and your paired participant's investment decision will
determine your market share.

Market shares

If you invest X ECUs and your paired participant invests Y ECUs in a given period, your market
share, which we will call S, in the next period, will be calculated according to the following formula:
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑋𝑋/𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌

In other words, your market share will be your investment divided by the sum of both your
investment and your paired participant's investment. You and you paired participant will make your
respective investment decisions at the same time without knowing each other's choices.
It is important to remember that your investment decision in a particular period, say Period 3,
determines your market share in the next period, or Period 4 in this example. You will only learn how
much your paired participant invested in Period 3, in Period 4. Your paired participant will only learn
how much you invested in Period 3, in Period 4.
Note: If both you and your paired participant chose to invest the same amount (i.e., X = Y), your
market share next period will be S = 0.50 or 50%.

Period profit

Your profit in a particular period will be determined by your market share (which, again, will
depend on your investment decision in the previous period), by market demand, and by an investment
cost.
Let us refer to your market share as S, to market demand as M, and to your investment cost
as C. Your period profit will be calculated according to the following formula:
Period Profit = 𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀 − 𝐶𝐶

In other words, you period profit will be your share of the market demand minus the amount
you spend on investing.

Your investment maximum and minimum

The amount of funds you will have available to invest in any given period will be limited by your return
on last period's investment according to the following formula:
Investment Maximum = 100% × 𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀
〈〈Investment Maximum = 75% × 𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀〉〉

The computer interface will remind you of your current investment maximum. Your investment
minimum will always be:

Investment costs

Investment Minimum = 5

The investment cost parameter will determine your total investment costs; its value will be 1.0.
Suppose you invest X ECUs in a particular period. Your investment costs will be:

where 1.0 is the investment cost parameter.

𝐶𝐶 = 1.0∗ 𝑋𝑋

〈Investment costs will be determined by how much you choose to invest and by whether
market demand increased or decreased last period. The investment cost parameter will determine
your total investment costs; its value will be either 1.0 or 0.5. Suppose you invest X ECUs in a particular
period. If market demand increased or stayed the same last period, your investment costs will be:
𝐶𝐶 = 1.0∗ 𝑋𝑋

where 1.0 is the investment cost parameter. On the other hand, if market demand decreased last
period, your investment costs will be:
𝐶𝐶 = 0.5∗ 𝑋𝑋

where 0.5 is the investment cost parameter. In other words, if market demand decreased last period,
your investment this period will be half as expensive as if market demand had instead increased or
stayed the same last period. Put another way: When market demand falls, investment costs fall. The
computer interface will remind you of your current investment cost parameter in each period. 〉

Cumulative profit

Take a second look at the above formula for period profit. If your investment cost is less than
your investment maximum, you will earn a positive period profit. Anytime your period profit is
positive, your cumulative profit will increase. The computer interface will remind you of your
cumulative profit throughout the experiment. You will be paid your cumulative profit at the end of the
experiment.

Market demand

As mentioned above, market demand (M) will increase, stay the same, or decrease from
period‐to‐period. Market demand will increase, stay the same, or decrease randomly.
Let us denote market demand this period by M1, and market demand last period by M0. Here is
how market demand will be determined:
𝑀𝑀1 = 10 + 0.9∗ 𝑀𝑀0 + 𝑹𝑹

In other words, this period's market demand will be the number 10, plus 90% of last period's
market demand, plus R.
R is short for "random," and it denotes a random number picked by the computer. The actual
value of R will vary each period, that is, it will be randomly drawn each period. Although it will vary,
there is a 99% chance that R will be some number from −26 to +26; on average, it will be 0. Another
way to think about this is that if the computer picked, say, a 1000 random numbers, the average of
these 1000 random numbers would be 0.
The computer interface will give you a market demand forecast each period. Because R is 0 on
average, this forecast will be:
Market demand forecast of next period′ s 𝑀𝑀 = 10 + 0.9∗ (𝑀𝑀 this period)

Note: Actual market demand can, and very likely will, differ from the forecasted value because
while R is 0 on average, it is random!

Additional information

Again, you will not learn how much your paired participant has invested in a period until the
next period. However, each period, the computer interface will ask you for a prediction about your
paired participant's investment before you submit your own investment. Importantly, this prediction
will not be shared with your paired, or any other, participant!
The computer interface will also ask you for a prediction about next period's market demand.

The calculator

The computer interface will contain a calculator. You can use this calculator to "test out"
different investment amounts. The calculator will use the predictions you enter about your paired
participant's investment and about market demand to provide you with an estimate of what your
return might be next period given various hypothetical investments. Note: Using the calculator is
entirely optional.
Remember: Your actual market share and thus your period profit will depend on your paired
participant's decision as well as your own.

Final words

In each period click on the "Make investment decision" button when you are ready to make
your investment decision. The calculator will no longer be available in that period. Three input boxes
will appear and you will indicate your own investment decision, your prediction about your paired
participant's investment, and your prediction about next period's market demand. Be sure to click the
"Invest" button to finalize your decisions, followed by a button that will show you the results and
which will advance you to the next period.
If you have any questions, please remain seated and silent but raise your hand so that a proctor
can come answer your question privately. When you have finished reading the instructions, please click
on the "Finish instructions" button to begin the experiment. You can review your hardcopy of these
instructions at any point during the experiment.

Quick summary
•
•
•
•

This experiment is composed of many periods
In each period, you will make an investment decision
You will have an investment maximum and an investment minimum
Your investment decision and your paired participant's investment decision will determine your
market share for the next period 〈Investment costs partly depend on a parameter that can
change depending on what market demand did last period; when market demand falls,
investment costs fall 〉

•

Market demand changes randomly each period (see above for the formula)

•

Your period profit will increase with your market share and with market demand 〈Your period
profit will increase with your market share and with market demand and will decrease with
your investment costs 〉

•

Your cash earnings at the end of the experiment will include all of your period profits.

Footnotes
1. Examples of low investment costs include low input good costs and low wages. Investment
opportunity costs are low if new investment is less disruptive to current production during
recessions than during expansions. For example, AT&T's [6] annual report notes: "In times of
heavy demand for new plant or new methods...it is often necessary to defer work on problems
of this kind [fundamental research] and devote energies of the staff to matters of more
immediate concern. In periods of reduced activity it is possible to attack vigorously those major
problems whose solution will be of great future benefit" (AT&T, [6]).
2. Zajac and Bazerman ([47]) provide additional motivation from the management literature: "[A]
competitive decision‐making perspective could be used to discuss other current topics in
industry and competitor analysis, such as...the choice of optimal research and development or
advertising levels (e.g., to what extent are levels chosen with competitors in mind?)."
3. The former suggests less investment, the latter more. Identification is even trickier with inter‐
industry variation in how liquidity hampers R&D investment (Ouyang, [33]).
4. Exogenous shifts in demand have received more attention. For a survey of this work, see
Potters and Suetens ([35]).
5. This paper examines both double auction and posted offer markets with demand, supply, and
demand‐and‐supply shifts. Its posted offer "cycling supply" and "trend demand" markets are
the most related to the present paper. There is convergence to the competitive equilibrium in
the former but not in the latter.
6. Our experiment contains the terms "investment" and "market demand" but not "firm." To
review the extent to which our experiment is contextualized, please see Figure 4 and the
instructions in Appendix C.
7. The external validity of our data must be judged in light of the reality that decision‐making in
many firms is complex. But one of the seminal papers in the investment‐cyclicality literature
(Aghion et al., [1]) models individual entrepreneurs—not firms. We gain insight into the
cyclicality of investment from such a model, and we also gain some insight from the
interactions of incentivized human participants in a stylized setting.
8. We use a duopoly setting so that we can examine strategic interaction. One can imagine an
alternative monopoly setting where a firm chooses an investment level, and their revenue is
stochastic but increasing in their investment. In this alternative setting, hypotheses such as "a
monopolist will increase their investment when their investment costs decrease" can be
analyzed, but strategic interaction cannot. We are not aware of any such experiments.
9. Obviously, the effect of investment in markets may be long‐lived. We impose a one‐period
effect here as the most tractable way of modeling how investment today affects profit
tomorrow.
10. This assumption captures the fact that the macroeconomy typically has a delayed effect on
investment costs.
11. Market demand must exceed a certain threshold to ensure that this is possible. We derive the
appropriate parameter restriction and report the liquidity endowment necessary for x1∗ to be

12.

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

feasible in Period 1 in Appendix B. Appendix B also examines nonmutual‐best‐response
investment strategies in the finitely‐repeated model and considers optimal investment in an
indefinitely‐repeated version of the model.
In general, a variable is said to be cyclical [counter‐cyclical] when "deviations from trend [in the
variable] are positively [negatively] correlated with deviations from trend in real GDP"
(Williamson, [46]).
The exchange rate between ECUs and U.S. dollars was 60 ECUs to $1.00 in all treatments.
We wanted the experiment length to be common knowledge and constant across sessions, but
we deemed this infeasible after observing the heterogeneity in participant decision time in a
pilot session (due to calculator use). If participants view the experiment as an indefinite game,
cooperation is possible in theory (see Appendix B), but the data quite clearly reject the notion
that participants invest "cooperatively." This suggests that valid concerns about the disconnect
between theory and experimental design are not, in fact, a major issue for our results. There
are three Cost Change sessions because Session I of Cost Change was relatively short compared
to the other sessions. While we analyze all of our data statistically (except where indicated), our
figures only show the first 30 periods as that is the period minima across treatments.
To avoid "deficit spending," participants had to invest at least 5 ECUs each period.
Standard tests suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue for specification (6) with our data.
We use Feasible instead of a participant's budget because our unit of observation is a market‐
period, not an individual participant‐period.
The effect of lowering investment costs by half is 22% of that predicted by our motivating
model when we drop the first 10 periods from our estimating sample.
Maybe participants did not understand that their rival's costs changed when their own costs
changed. If a participant understands that their own costs change, but believes that their rival
always has 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0, their investment best‐response is very similar to the optimal investment
path in Figure 3 (the spikes when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 are only slightly less pronounced) and thus is very
different from the actual investment path. We note here that slight departures from the
optimal investment path do not explain the observed data either. If one participant in a market
is slightly off the optimal path, the other participant should invest very near the optimal path,
because the best response curve is flat in the neighborhood of optimal investment.
Another possible explanation for why our participants invested suboptimally is that our
participants initially had no experience in our complex environment. As with most experiments,
we cannot exclude this possibility. However, our estimate of the effect of lowering investment
costs by half only changes from −0.15 to −0.22 when we drop Periods 1–10 from our estimating
sample in Section 4's regression analysis. Moreover, it is not clear whether greater experience
leads to more competition (and results closer to the optimal investment path) or to more
cooperation in our experimental environment.
It is also conceivable that participants were "competitive" during market expansions and
"cooperative" during market recessions. We would expect to see counter‐cyclical cooperation
strategies in No Cost Change if such strategies were employed at all, because coordination
would have been easier with α always at unity. But again, average investment in No Cost
Change was consistently above optimal investment in both expansions and recessions (see
Figure 5a). So there is no support for a counter‐cyclical collusion result in the (rough) spirit of
Rotemberg and Saloner ([36]). It is possible that the cost change itself triggered cooperative
investment (Cost Change participants were "competitive" with 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0 but "cooperative"
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with 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5). However, we find this conjecture far less parsimonious than the heuristic
conjecture outlined in Section 4.1.4.
Figure A1 in Appendix A shows that in all three treatments, participants' predictions about
market demand were not, on average, radically different from actual demand.
We estimate a� and b� for Periods 3–30. There is not enough data to estimate prior to Period 3.
The time series of the average best response to expected rival investment is very similar to the
time series of optimal investment, so participants were not best‐responding to the expected
investment of their rival.
Of course this theory is preceded by Simon ([41]), Cyert and March ([13]), and Leibenstein ([29])
among others. Related theories of "rational inattention" are also plausible here.
Examples of heuristic use by firms abound. Notably, cost‐plus pricing heuristics are employed
by many firms where an item is priced by applying a fixed mark up to the item's average cost
(see Hall and Hitch, [24]; Hanson, [26]). Also, "Several studies have documented that many
firms have as a decision rule that R&D expenditures should be a roughly constant fraction of
sales" (Nelson and Winter, [32]).
Recall that the forecast is 𝐄𝐄𝑡𝑡 [𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 1 ] = 10 + 0.9𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 .
The per period investment figures are averaged over Periods 1–30 since both sessions had at
least 30 periods.
For Periods 1–30, No Cost Change participants earned 28.6 ECUs per period on average. The
equivalent figures are 30.1 for Cost Change, 44.8 for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00, and 24.6
for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝜙𝜙 = 0.75.
Participants with 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 actually had an average return of 97.2 ECUs per period.
The estimated coefficient on Δln(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ) is −0.16 when we drop the first 10 periods from our
estimating sample. Optimal investment was feasible for 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 [𝜙𝜙 = 0.75] participants
91% [37%] of the time. These percentages are driven by the low cost periods where optimal
investment was possible 78% [7%] of the time for 𝜙𝜙 = 1.00 [𝜙𝜙 = 0.75] participants.
There is robust evidence of overbidding in experimental contests generally (Sheremeta, [40];
Dechenaux et al., [16]). More specifically, Fallucchi et al. ([20]) find overbidding in proportional‐
prize contests with rival feedback (as we have) and Chowdhury et al. ([12]) report overbidding
in proportional‐prize contests where the cost of effort is linear in effort (as here).
There is recent experimental evidence that CEOs act less strategically (more cooperatively) than
otherwise‐identical, non‐CEOs (Holm et al., [27]).
When 𝜌𝜌 < 1, the autoregressive process 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 − 1 + ɛ𝑡𝑡 is stationary and converges
𝜇𝜇
to 1−𝜌𝜌 . Given our parameterization (𝜇𝜇 = 10 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.9) market demand converges to 100.
We consider a "Cooperative/Cooperative Investment" strategy of 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ /2 . Many other
cooperative strategies involving investments less than xt∗ —including zero investment—are
mutual best‐responses in the indefinitely‐repeated model. However, none of these alternatives
appear relevant because the data are always above 𝑥𝑥 ∗ (on average) when 𝛼𝛼 = 1.0.
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